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We examine the economic depression that Argentina suffered in the 1980s, as well as the 
subsequent recovery, from the perspective of growth theory, taking total factor 
productivity as exogenous. The predictions of the neoclassical growth model conform 
rather well with the evidence for the “lost decade” depression and at the same time point 
to a puzzle: Investment did not recover in the subsequent decade of the 1990s nearly as 
fast as it should have according to that same model.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION  
The unusual features and severity of the Great Depression in the United States 
have been the object of much speculation among economists and social scientists 
intrigued by a phenomenon still resistant to a widely accepted explanation. Lack of 
progress in understanding the Great Depression may be attributed, at least in part, to the 
unavoidable limitations of the “event study” methodology with which most scholars have 
approached the “case,” possibly out of the perception that the Great Depression was an 
episode so rare that it is the only experience with depressions available for study in actual 
economies. 
In addition, implicit in that case study approach to the Great Depression is often 
the view that depressions are not just rare in frequency, but also in nature. That is, they 
represent an essential “discontinuity” with the past and the future, perhaps because, for 
reasons not fully understood, the behavior that economic agents typically display in 
normal times is suspended, as it were, during economic depressions and replaced with a 
different one. The difficulty with this view is that the very rarity of depressions conspires 
against the ability to identify which elements, if any, of the economic environment or 
agents’ behavior and expectations during economic depressions are substantially 
different, to the point of discontinuity, from more normal times.  
That is an unfortunate state of affairs, because protracted and severe depressions 
are not as rare as many scholars seem inclined to believe. In fact, this paper has been 
motivated by the evidence that not long ago, during the 1980s (the so-called “lost 
decade”), Argentina experienced a rather severe economic depression as defined in this 
volume:
1 Detrended output per working age population declined along that decade a 
stunning 30 percent and it was 20 percent below trend by the time the decade was over.  
Faced with this evidence, it is only natural to ask: Can standard growth theory 
account for the economic depression of Argentina’s lost decade? In this chapter we 
answer this question in the affirmative: Our numerical experiments for a parsimonious 
neoclassical growth model that takes Total Factor Productivity (TFP hereafter) as 
exogenous generates paths for real GDP per capita, capital input, and the capital–output 
ratio that are strikingly close to the actual paths of those variables during the lost decade.  
                                                 
1 See introductory chapter by Kehoe and Prescott in this same volume. 
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 We interpret those findings as evidence that economic depressions are not 
necessarily associated with any abnormal deviations or discontinuity in the formation of 
expectations or in the behavior of economic agents from normal times. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the paper uncovers that if there was any abnormal or 
discontinuous behavior in the light of the neoclassical growth model, it was not during 
the depression years of the lost decade but in the subsequent recovery: capital 
accumulation during the expansion of the 1990s proceeded at a lower rate than the same 
neoclassical growth model would have predicted. We conjecture that accounting for this 
anomaly might be as important for the understanding of Argentina’s growth experience 
as it is to account for that country’s lost decade years. Furthermore, since Cole and 
Ohanian (1999) report a similar “success” of the neoclassical growth model to account 
for the U.S. Great Depression and a similar “failure” to account for the recovery that 
followed, the resolution of the “1990s puzzle” for Argentina may have potentially 
important implications for growth theory in general and, as such, is an interesting 
research topic in its own right. 
It is important to emphasize that it was precisely to be able to uncover regularities 
across countries like the one just reported for the United States and Argentina that this 
chapter, in the spirit of this volume, examines Argentina’s growth experience during the 
depression of the 1980s and the recovery of the 1990s exclusively through the lens of the 
neoclassical growth model. In so doing, we do not imply that the neoclassical growth 
model is the only relevant one for the study of economic depressions. Rather, the hope is 
that studying economic depressions (and subsequent recoveries) with that same model 
across countries might lead to insights into the nature of depressions and of economic 
growth in general that would not be possible with the limitations inherent to the event 
study approach mentioned earlier. 
A quick summary of our methodology is as follows: We compute the total factor 
productivity (TFP) time series (Solow residuals) of a typical constant-returns-to-scale 
production function with standard growth accounting methods and calibrate a 
parsimonious neoclassical growth model to the Argentine economy during “normal 
times,” or more rigorously speaking, to its implied steady state. We then compute the 
economic agents’ decision rules under the assumption of rational expectations and feed 
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 the measured Solow residuals into the model economy to generate the paths for real GDP 
per capita, capital stock, and employment (number of workers) induced by those decision 
rules. The comparison of the model-generated path for each variable with the actual data 
for the same variable makes it possible to infer which fraction of the year-to-year 
variations of such variables during the lost decade years and subsequent recovery can be 
accounted for by the actually observed TFP shocks. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGENTINE GROWTH EXPERIENCE 
Figure 1 offers a quick overview of Argentina’s economic growth in the second 
half of the 20
th century. It plots an index of real GDP per working-age person from 1950 
to 1997, detrended by the average growth rate of the labor augmenting technological 
progress (the TFP factor) for the period 1951–79 (1.03 percent). This choice will be more 
thoroughly justified later, in the section of the paper devoted to the calibration of the 
model economy to Argentina’s long-run growth features. 
According to Figure 1 and as anticipated in the introduction, by the end of the lost 
decade, in 1990, Argentina’s detrended GDP per capita had fallen a striking 30 percent 
below its level of ten years earlier and 20 percent below trend.  
To identify the sources of growth, we undertook a growth accounting exercise. 
Appendix A outlines our data sources and the method we used in constructing these 
series. 
In our growth accounting exercise, we assume that the production function is 
given by 
θ θ − =
1
t t t t L K A Y         ( 1 )  
where Y is aggregate output, A is TFP, K is aggregate capital, and L is aggregate 
employment. 
   Our growth accounting differs in appearance, but is equivalent to standard growth 
accounting. We decompose output per capita into three factors: the TFP factor , 
employment intensity (L), and the capital intensity factor( . This 
decomposition is convenient because the growth rate of the efficiency factor coincides 
) 1 /( 1 θ − A
) 1 /( ) /
θ θ − Y K
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 with the trend growth rate of output per adult when employment per capita and capital 
intensity are constant, as they should be along the balanced-growth path.
2 
Table 1 presents the results of our growth accounting exercise for a capital share 
of 0.4 (see our discussion below on calibration).  
From 1951 to 1979, GDP per working-age person grew at a 1.7 percent annual 
rate. TFP and capital intensity contributed about equally to that growth, while 
employment intensity subtracted about 0.2 percentage points from it. Within this period, 
the 1960s stand out for rapid 3 percent GDP growth, accounted almost entirely by 
productivity gains. The 1950s and 1970s, on the other hand, reveal capital intensity as the 
only factor making significant positive contributions to GDP growth in those two 
decades, when TFP exhibited a relatively poor performance, in particular in the 1970s, 
during which it declined at an average annual rate of 0.14 percent.
3  
The observation that capital intensity grew at annual rates slightly below 1 percent 
in the whole period 1951–79 suggests that Argentina may not have been growing along 
its balanced growth path then, but that it was rather in the process of converging to the 
higher income per capita of more developed nations. The possible presence of transition 
dynamics over this period had implications for the calibration of the capital–output ratio, 
as discussed later in the appropriate section of the paper. 
The mild decline of TFP during the 1970s already reported turned into an 
unprecedented collapse in the subsequent lost decade of the 1980s, during which the TFP 
factor fell at an average rate of almost 3 percent a year, that is, at about the same rate at 
which it had increased instead during the 1960s.
4 This collapse of productivity, 
moderated by mild increases in labor and capital intensity, more than accounted for the 
2.1 percent average annual decline in GDP per capita during that depression. 
                                                 
2As explained in the introductory chapter of this volume, this “intensive” version of an otherwise standard 




 and then solving the resulting expression for GDP per capita. 
 
3 Recall that the gross TFP factor is equal to (1 + ()
 , which implies that total factor productivity, as 
calculated from (1 + ()
(1 - 2) = (1 – 0.0024)
(1 – 0.4) , declined at an average annual of 0.14 percent in the period 
1969–79. 
4 By the arithmetic of the previous footnote, this explains an average annual total factor productivity 
decline of around 1.75 percent for the lost decade. 
 
  6 
 The rather dramatic decline of TFP during the lost decade was followed by an 
impressive turnaround in the subsequent 1990–97 period. Output per capita grew at 
average rates 2.5 times higher than for the period 1951–79. This growth was driven by an 
unprecedented 7 percent growth in TFP, partially offset by a rather deep decline in the 
capital intensity that hints at the “1990s excessive capital-shallowing puzzle” that, as 
reported below, we regard as one of the relevant findings of this study. 
Summing up, according to our growth accounting exercise, TFP seems to have 
been the dominant force behind Argentina’s growth performance in the two decades that 
closed the last century. This feature of Argentina’s recent growth experience, along with 
the observation that the neoclassical growth model takes TFP as exogenous, leads 
naturally to the question addressed in this paper: Which percentage of the growth rates of 
the main macroeconomic variables (GDP, capital stock, employment) during those two 
decades can such a neoclassical growth model account for if subject to the same 
productivity shocks measured for Argentina over those same periods? The next section 
presents the tools and measures with which we’ll attempt to answer that question. 
 
3. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK  
 
Model 
  We use the stochastic growth model. All variables are in per capita terms. 
Household preferences can be represented by: 
) 1 /( ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( 1 1
0





t l c E       (2) 
 
where ct represents consumption, lt the fraction of the time endowment devoted to work, 
α the utility-function share parameter, η the population growth rate, and σ the coefficient 
of constant relative risk aversion (or the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of the composite commodity). 
  Technology is described by 
θ θ γ
− + = +
1 ] ) 1 [( t
t
t t t t l k z x c      (3) 
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ε ρ t zt zt + = +1       ( 5 )  
 
where kt is the capital stock, xt is investment, zt a stochastic technological shock, and θ 
the capital input share in national income. The model assumes labor augmenting 
technological progress at the rate γ. On the balanced growth path, output, consumption 
and capital grow at the rate (1 + η) (1 + γ). 
 
Calibration  
  The model economy is calibrated by choosing parameters so that the balanced 
growth path matches certain steady-state features of the measured economies (see Cooley 
and Prescott 1995). 
  We chose the period 1951–79 to establish the long run features of Argentina’s 
growth rather than the whole period for which the relevant data are available (1951–97) 
because, in the spirit of calibration, the period 1951–79 does not include any of the 
observations corresponding to the two decades that are the object of study in this paper. 
That is, we calibrate Argentina’s economy to its long run features as revealed by the 
information available to the economic agents by 1979 and ask whether a neoclassical 
growth model thus calibrated can account reasonably well for Argentina’s relevant 
growth features afterwards, during the lost decade and subsequent recovery of the 1990s. 
  Consistent with that choice of reference period, the following parameters (with 
their actual values in parentheses) were set to their average value over 1951–79: annual 
growth rate of working-age population (1.55 percent), labor augmenting technological 
progress (TFP factor, 1.03 percent), and the investment–output ratio (0.226). 
  It would be tempting to set the average capital–output ratio to its average over that 
period as well. However, unlike with the average TFP growth, this procedure is likely to 
underestimate the underlying long-run capital–output ratio if in the reference period the 
economy is not on the balanced growth path, but converging to it from “above” or 
“below.” As per the evidence discussed in the previous section, the latter seems to have 
been the case for Argentina during the reference period. Accordingly, the underlying 
long-run capital–output ratio is likely to be closer in magnitude to the ratios actually 
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 observed toward the end of that period than to their average over that same period. Given 
that the observed capital–output ratio for Argentina was still in an upward trend by the 
time it reached values of around 1.9 in 1978 and 1979, we adopted 2 as a reasonable 
guess for the value of that ratio in the long run.
5  
  That calibrated capital–output ratio, along with the investment-output share of 
0.226 calibrated earlier, implies a depreciation rate of about 11.3 percent, via the standard 
neoclassical growth model steady state relationship δ = (x/y)/(k/y). This depreciation rate 
abstracts from total factor productivity growth and population growth because the model 
economy used for the numerical experiments assumes no growth. Hansen (1997) has 
shown that this way of calibrating the depreciation rate ensures a better correspondence 
between the series generated by the model and the actual data of an economy with 
growth. 
Another parameter that is particularly challenging to calibrate for the case of 
Argentina is the capital share parameter θ of the production function. The national 
income accounts typically used to that effect in countries like the United States are not 
available in Argentina, which can therefore estimate its GDP only from the product 
accounts. As a result, the labor and capital cost shares in GDP cannot be calculated 
directly from reported factor incomes. Therefore, we set the capital input share, θ, to 
0.40, as if Argentina’s production technology were the same as that of the United States. 
While some estimates have the capital share at 60 percent of GDP, most researchers 
consider that this figure would be closer to 40 percent were it not for the substantial 
underreporting of labor income in the informal sector of Argentina’s economy.
6 
The steady-state real interest rate was set equal to 8.7 percent, as implied by the 
steady-state relationship r = θY/K – δ (again, abstracting for the reasons previously given 
from long-run growth rates).  
The utility-function share parameter, α, was set to imply that the average 
household member spends a fraction 0.3 of its time endowment in the labor market, a 
                                                 
5 However, sensitivity analysis suggests that the results are quite sensitive to the choice of this value. 
6 De Gregorio and Lee (1999) find that the labor share could be as large as 0.7, according to the indirect 
measure proposed by Sarel (1997). 
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 standard assumption for the United States that casual inspection of the available data 
suggests reasonable for Argentina as well.  
 The coefficient of constant relative risk aversion was set at the level used in 
similar studies for the United States, that is, σ = 2. 
Finally, the persistence parameter ρ, the autoregressive component of the total factor 
productivity shock, was established from an autoregression on the Solow residuals (TFP) 
computed in the previous section of the paper for the period 1951–79, and set, 
accordingly, equal to 0.56. The innovation (εt) is assumed to be an i.i.d. process with 




In our numerical experiments, we exploit the second welfare theorem to compute 
the solution of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium neoclassical growth model. 
Since σ > 1, 0 ≤ α ≤1 and 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, the conditions for the second welfare theorem hold. 
In particular, the utility function is concave, and the production function defines a convex 
set for the resource constraint. This will guarantee that the solution to the social planner’s 
problem can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium. Notice that this problem is a 
version of the stochastic growth model first developed by Brock and Mirman (1972). 
Our strategy to compute the only solution of the model is to find the value 
function and associated policy (or allocation) functions. Following Kydland and Prescott 
(1982), we substitute the resource constraint in the utility function and rewrite the 
resulting expression as a quadratic approximation around the steady state. This defines a 
linear quadratic problem with well-known properties. In particular, the policy (or 
allocation) functions are linear in the state variables and can be readily computed with 
standard numerical methods (see Hansen and Prescott 1995).  
Following the standard convention in that approach, the policy functions and 
resulting allocations are computed under the assumption that economic agents form 
expectations about the future rationally, based on the information available at the 
beginning of each period. This is in contrast with other papers in this same volume that 
assume perfect foresight.  
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 For that reason, and in the spirit of facilitating comparisons across countries that 
inspires this volume, we report in Appendix B the results for our simulations under the 
alternative but unrealistic assumption of perfect foresight. Here it suffices to mention that 
under this alternative assumption some of our numerical experiments generated outcomes 
that differed from their stochastic counterparts in quantitatively significant ways. Such 
discrepancies might serve as a warning that considerable caution should be exercised in 
drawing conclusions from a perfect foresight model for volatile economies, subject to the 
same kind of wild depression and boom swings that Argentina experienced in the two 
decades studied here. 
 
4. EXPERIMENTS  
Purpose 
  In this section, we ask what fraction of the growth rates of the relevant economic 
variables during the lost decade and subsequent recovery can be accounted for by a 
stochastic neoclassical growth model in which exogenous shocks to TFP are the only 
source of uncertainty. To that effect, as indicated in the previous section, we compute the 
equilibrium decision rules and simulate the path of the relevant variables of the model by 
feeding the measured TFP into the equilibrium decision rules. 
 
Findings 
As Figure 2 makes apparent, the growth model with TFP taken as exogenous can 
account with remarkable precision for the dynamics of capital accumulation during 
Argentina’s lost decade. Visual inspection of that figure, where the data, as in all 
subsequent figures, have been detrended by the TFP factor and working-age population 
growth, suggests that according to our numerical experiments, measured productivity can 
account for all of the decline in the capital stock during that depression.  
However, Figure 3 reveals that the performance of the model is not as stellar with 
respect to labor input, especially in the second half of the depression. According to the 
model, labor input should have declined at an average annual rate of about 0.8 percent 
between 1984 and 1990, instead of increasing at that rate, as the data show.  
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 Despite missing a non-negligible fraction of the dynamics of the labor input, the 
neoclassical growth model predicts capital input so precisely that overall TFP can 
account for practically all the decline in GDP during the lost decade, as shown in Figure 
4. By the same token, TFP accounted for almost all of the variations in the capital–output 
ratio over that same period (Figure 5). 
Overall, the results of the numerical experiments suggest that an economic agent 
equipped at the onset of the lost decade with the neoclassical growth model and 
knowledge of the sequence of the TFP exogenous shocks that would hit the economy 
from then on would have been able to pick up remarkably well the dynamic paths of the 
capital stock, GDP, and capital–output ratio during that depression. The same observer, 
on the other hand, would have missed the direction of change of labor input between 
1984 and 1990, with the gap between observed and predicted values as large as 10 
percent toward the end of the lost decade. 
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, inspection of Figure 4 suggests that whereas the 
neoclassical growth seems to be able to account for the lost decade depression rather 
easily, the same is not the case for the expansion that followed.  
Indeed, according to Figure 4, output during the recovery of the 1990s should 
have grown at a rate two-thirds faster than it actually did. This prediction is a natural 
consequence of the overestimation over that period of the capital stock, which according 
to the model should have been about 15 percent higher than it actually was in the last 
year of that expansion, as shown in Figure 2. The resulting “1990s excess capital 
shallowing puzzle,” reflected in a lower than predicted capital–output ratio and first 
discussed in Kydland and Zarazaga (2002b), is apparent also in Figure 5. On the other 
hand, the model captures well the general upward trend in labor input during the 
expansion, with any discrepancies between predicted and observed values never 
exceeding 5 percent, half the size of the equivalent discrepancies during the lost decade. 
In other words, the neoclassical growth model fails during the expansion years 
where it succeeds during the depression years, and vice versa. During the lost decade 
depression, the neoclassical growth model accounts extremely well for the evolution of 
capital input, although it underestimates labor input to a considerable extent. During the 
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 expansion, these results are reversed: The neoclassical model accounts rather well for 
labor input, but it overestimates capital input instead.  
The apparent “failure” of the neoclassical growth model to account for the 
expansion following a recession doesn’t seem to be unique to Argentina. As mentioned in 
the introduction, Cole and Ohanian (1999) report a similar result for the United States. 
Thus, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, taken together these findings suggest that the 
relevant question for future research might be not so much whether the neoclassical 
growth model can account for depressions, but for booms. A resolution of the “1990s 
puzzle” for Argentina could therefore have important implications for growth theory in 
general.  
In the next section, we offer some conjectures that might help to explain the two 
“misses” of the neoclassical growth model reported above, that is, the underestimation of 
labor input during the lost decade and the overestimation of capital input during the 
subsequent expansion. 
 
5. CONJECTURES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF THE ANOMALIES 
 
The Lost Decade Excessive Employment Growth: The Employment Policies 
Conjecture 
We found in our experiment that the model predicted that labor input should have 
declined overall by about 10 percent during the lost decade, while in the data measured 
labor input actually increased by 3 percent. We conjecture that government policy in 
Argentina might help explain this anomaly.  
It has often been claimed that employment in provincial governments and state-
owned enterprises in Argentina has been a covert form of unemployment insurance. 
Argentina was a heavily regulated economy until 1990, and it is well known that 
“payroll-credited” unemployment insurance payments are the common device through 
which centrally planned economies can artificially increase employment or reduce 
measured unemployment. 
Until recently, the information in the household surveys did not distinguish 
employment in the private and public sectors. This deficiency cannot be solved with data 
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 from other sources, because information on employment in the public sector is virtually 
nonexistent. The official statistics report systematic information on government 
employment only for the central administration, and even so, they do not always include 
contract personnel that usually fluctuate more than the permanent staff.  
There is, however, some indirect evidence that suggests the magnitude of 
government employment programs. Information on the number of workers employed by 
provincial administrations from nonofficial sources, such as in Chisari et al. (1993), 
suggests that employment at the provincial and national administration levels may have 
represented between 10 and 13 percent of the total number of workers in the period of 
analysis. However, this figure does not include employment in the vast number of state-
owned enterprises that were still under government control during the lost decade. There 
are no official records of the number of workers employed in those government 
conglomerates. One way to establish a rough upper bound for that figure is to assume that 
all the increase in unemployment between the end of 1990 and 1995 corresponded 
exactly to the number of workers who lost their “hidden unemployment” when their firms 
were transferred to the private sector during the large-scale privatization process 
implemented over those years. Under that extreme assumption, the total number of 
workers in the public sector during the lost decade may have been on the order of 20 to 
25 percent of total employment.  
That fraction of total employment is not negligible and strongly suggests that 
government job programs may help explain why employment didn’t decline during the 
lost decade, as predicted by the neoclassical growth model, but increased instead.  
The policy implicit in those programs may have been to keep the job creation 
process going at a time when adverse and repeated productivity shocks would have led to 
a decline in overall employment. That is, negative productivity shocks like the ones 
observed in the lost decade in Argentina are typically associated with declines in real 
wages and therefore, employment, as households devote a larger share of their time to 
leisure or nonmarket activities. The conjecture entertained here is that the government 
prevented this outcome through job creation initiatives that kept real wages above the 
marginal product of labor. Faced with this artificially high opportunity cost of leisure, a 
larger fraction of the population than otherwise chose to seek employment or remained 
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 employed in the sectors of the economy favored with explicit or implicit employment 
subsidies, mainly government agencies and conglomerates.  
The appalling state of disarray of the public finances throughout the lost decade is 
consistent with that hypothesis. By all accounts, bloated public sector payrolls were a 
major contributor to the large fiscal deficits observed throughout that decade, ultimately 
responsible for the hyperinflationary outbursts of 1989 and 1990. 
This conjecture is not without its challenges, because the introduction of 
employment subsidies will require the explicit introduction of the government budget 
constraint into the analysis. A more rigorous assessment of the ability of this government 
jobs programs hypothesis to explain away the excessive labor input anomaly of the lost 
decade will need first to measure the size of those programs and then quantify the effects 
on capital and labor inputs of the taxes needed to finance them. Collecting the necessary 
data to calibrate taxes, subsidies, and other relevant aspects of the job creation programs 
might prove a difficult but worthwhile research effort. 
 
The Excessive Capital-Shallowing Puzzle of the 1990s: The Capital Taxation 
Conjecture  
As with the labor input growth anomaly of the lost decade just discussed, we 
conjecture that the excessive capital-shallowing anomaly of the 1990s can eventually be 
explained away by government policies as well—in particular, government policies that 
directly or indirectly penalized the accumulation of capital. 
One possibility is that after the 1980s Argentina switched to a regime of higher 
capital taxes. This conjecture is motivated by the recurrent episodes of bank deposit 
confiscations and sovereign debt defaults that Argentina has experienced in the last 
twenty years, the latest such episodes very recently, in 2001. 
Higher taxes on capital are associated, of course, with a lower long-run capital–
output ratio, while the model in this paper maintains that ratio unchanged at 2. Given the 
low levels of that ratio at the end of the lost decade, the model induces a strong bounce-
back effect of capital input during the positive productivity shock years of the 1990s. But 
that effect would be dampened, more in line with the data, if taxes on capital or 
equivalent policies implemented over the two decades studied in this paper had reduced 
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 the long-run capital–output ratio below the calibrated value of 2. Notice that this 
conjecture is consistent with the previous one: Taxes on capital are a good candidate to 
have been the source of funds to finance the job creation programs that might have been 
in place in the lost decade. 
A related conjecture is based on the possibility of endogenous credit constraints of 
the type discussed in Kehoe and Levine (2001) and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). A 
growing body of literature suggests that small open economies face borrowing constraints 
that are binding not as much during downturns but during expansions (see, for example, 
Kehoe and Perri 2002). The reason for that counterintuitive outcome is that lenders do 
not have much interest anyway in investing in a country undergoing a period of low or 
declining productivity growth. By contrast, capital owners would like to invest a lot 
during a period of high productivity growth. The presence of default risk reduces their 
incentives to do so, however, because investors realize that it is at good times, after it has 
been able to lure capital into the country, that its governments will have the highest 
incentives to increase taxes on capital, perhaps to the point of confiscation.  
Thus, a possible explanation of why investment remained so weak (relative to the 
model) in Argentina during the 1990s is that potential investors, their memories of that 
country’s sovereign debt default in the mid-1980s and confiscation of deposits in 1990 
still fresh, remained wary of similar episodes in the future and, accordingly, didn’t risk 
their capital in Argentina as much as the neoclassical growth model would predict. 
Indeed, those fears have materialized recently, when in 2001 Argentina implemented the 
largest confiscation of deposits in its history and then proceeded to declare a massive 
default on its sovereign debt obligations. 
Exploring the extent to which this “risk of default” conjecture can resolve 
Argentina’s excess capital-shallowing puzzle of the 1990s will eventually require 
considerable departures from the default-free world of the neoclassical growth model, a 
task that poses challenging theoretical and empirical issues that should be part of the 





This paper has explored the quantitative predictions of a rather parsimonious 
neoclassical growth model economy relative to the actual economy. Overall, our findings 
suggest that neoclassical growth theory can account for a great deal of Argentina’s 
economic depression during the lost decade of the 1980s. In that regard, the evidence 
does not seem to provide support for the hypothesis that economic depressions involve a 
breakdown or discontinuity in the behavior of economic agents or in the way they form 
expectations about the future.  
Instead, we uncover a puzzle in the recovery that followed the depression. 
According to the neoclassical growth model, the capital stock should have ended up 
about 15 percent higher in the last recorded year of the expansion of the 1990s, while in 
the data (detrended) that stock remained flat instead throughout the whole expansion. 
Given a similar failure of the neoclassical growth model to account for the recovery that 
immediately followed the U.S. Great Depression, as reported in Cole and Ohanian 
(1999), we regard this capital-shallowing puzzle of the 1990s as potentially the most 
interesting finding of this study and conjecture that accounting for it could prove a 
challenging task with important implications for growth theory. 
The most puzzling aspect of the evidence, however, is why total factor 
productivity declined at an average rate of almost 3 percent for the unusually long time of 
a decade, the lost decade of the 1980s, and why it recovered so spectacularly at annual 
average rates of 7 percent in the subsequent expansion of the 1990s. It would be tempting 
to link those wild swings in productivity to the distinctive policy regimes in place in 
those two periods: a heavily regulated and closed economy in default in the lost decade, a 
more open, less regulated economy engaged in ambitious privatization programs in the 
1990s. However, such a relationship is not warranted by the maintained hypothesis in this 
paper of exogenous productivity shocks. Any progress in establishing such a link 
(perhaps along the lines of Parente and Prescott 1999) will undoubtedly constitute a huge 
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 Table 1 




GDP per working 
adult 
(percent) 




1951–59  0.47   0.19   1.30   –1.00  
1959–69  3.01   3.02   –0.04   0.03  
1969–79  1.51   –0.24   1.53   0.23  
1951–79  1.74   1.03   0.90   –0.19  
1979–90  –2.10   –2.90   0.48   0.34  
1990–97  4.46   7.28   –2.87   0.25  
1979–97 0.40    0.94   –0.83   0.30  
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 APPENDIX A 
Data Sources and Methodology 
 
GDP and Population 
The GDP series, in pesos of 1986, is from Meloni (1999).The working-age 
population data was obtained from CELADE (1985), applying geometric interpolation 
for the missing years. 
 
Labor Input 
  The labor input is measured as the number of workers. For the period 1940–79, 
labor input is based on an employment series reported in Elías (1992). He used a series 
on wage earners’ employment published by the Central Bank of Argentina for some of 
the years in the period and completed the missing years by interpolating labor force 
participation rates from population censuses run every 10 years.
7  
The procedure followed by Elías might understate the actual employment growth 
for years in which employment is estimated using labor force participation rates from 
census records. Labor force participation rates include both employed and unemployed 
workers. Unemployment rates experienced a continued decline between the year they 
began being measured (1963) and the last year of this period (1979). This 
underestimation of labor input may result in the mismeasurement of the Solow residuals 
for at least some of the years in the period 1963–79.  
  Employment data from 1980–91 are from the “Encuesta Permanente de Hogares” 
(Permanent Households Survey). The Ministry of Labor uses these surveys to compute, 
for each urban center, the fraction of the total number of individuals in all households 
interviewed that have reported some form of employment. It then applies the resulting 
proportion to the overall population of the corresponding district to arrive at an estimate 
of the total number of employed in each urban area. The estimation of the number of 
employed in areas not covered by the survey is accomplished by applying to the 
estimated total population in those areas the average of the employment coefficient just 
                                                 
7 Elías’ study contains only a brief account of the procedures used to construct this series. Some of the 
additional details just outlined were reported as documented in a written response by the author to a 
specific query we made in that regard. 
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 described, weighted by the population of all urban centers other than the capital, the 
Buenos Aires metropolitan area. 
One difficulty with these surveys is that it is not clear how well the households 
included in them represent the characteristics of the whole population. 
 
Capital and Investment 
  We used the permanent inventory method to construct a capital stock series from 
investment figures from 1900 to 1997. The investment series, in 1986 prices, was kindly 
provided by Osvaldo Meloni.  
  The permanent inventory method requires applying different depreciation 
schemes to different types of assets. A typical distinction is between investment in 
machinery and equipment, nonresidential structures, and residential structures. 
Unfortunately, Argentina’s national accounts do not report the last two concepts 
separately. A possible option to confront this difficulty is to ignore any distinction 
between the nonresidential and residential components of investment in structures.
8 An 
alternative followed here, based on standard practice by other researchers, was to assume 
that the nonresidential component is a fixed percentage of overall investment in 
structures. To that end, based on the considerations in Meloni (1999), we assume that 46 
percent of that aggregate corresponds to nonresidential structures, with the remainder 54 
percent allocated to residential structures.
9 
  For the purpose of applying the permanent inventory method, we adopted 
depreciation parameters that combined the geometric and linear depreciation schemes in 
Hofman (1991) and Meloni (1999). In particular, we assumed that residential structures 
have a useful life of 50 years, nonresidential structures 40 years, and machinery and 
equipment 15 years.
10 As in a linear depreciation scheme, the assets lose any residual 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 This was implicitly the procedure adopted in Kydland and Zarazaga (2002a). 
9 Meloni, however, applied a substantially different percentage starting in 1991. Upon examination of the 
data, however, we concluded that such methodology, applied also in Kydland and Zarazaga (2002a), might 
result in the underestimation of the capital stock during the 1990s expansion. Accordingly, we applied the 
fixed 46 percentage all the way through instead. 
10 The capital stock estimates for the United States assume a linear depreciation scheme with useful life of 
the assets that are roughly in line with the ones assumed in this paper. 
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 value after the last year of their lifetime. Under this assumption, the residual value of an 
asset at period t of productive capital installed n periods ago is given by It (1-δ)
n, where δ 
is the depreciation rate, It the investment in the corresponding asset in period t, and n ≤ T. 
The implicit depreciation rate δ was chosen so that the residual value of the relevant asset 
at the last year of its useful life is given by It /T, that is, to satisfy the equation (1-δ)
T = 
1/T. This method implied annual depreciation rates of 7.53 percent for investment in 
residential structures, 8.81 percent for investment in nonresidential structures, and 16.5 
percent for machinery and equipment. 
It is important to emphasize that implicit in the standard growth accounting 
method we used to measure TFP is the assumption that all factors of production, in 
particular capital input, are fully utilized. However, independent evidence suggests that 
capital utilization in Argentina declined substantially during the lost decade and 
recovered significantly in the subsequent expansion. Equivalently, capital input may have 
fallen during the lost decade more than our perpetual inventory method measures 
suggests. Likewise, it may have increased more than that measure during the subsequent 
expansion. Although there are no widely accepted measures of capital input adjusted for 
capital utilization, it is important to keep in mind that an unknown fraction of the large 
TFP shocks reported in Table 1 may be the result of changes in capital utilization missed 
by the perpetual inventory method. 
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 APPENDIX B 
Numerical Experiments Under Perfect Foresight 
 
  The results in the main body of the paper were derived under the assumption that 
agents form their expectations about the uncertain future in a rational way, in the usual 
sense that their subjective beliefs about the likelihood of future events coincides with the 
actual probability distribution of such events. 
  Many other papers in this volume, however, have adopted the alternative 
assumption that in making their decisions, the economic agents know the future with 
absolute certainty. In the spirit of facilitating comparisons across countries that inspires 
this volume, we report in this appendix the outcomes of the perfect foresight counterparts 
of the numerical experiments under rational expectations presented in the main body of 
the paper. 
  Unrealistic as it may be from a theoretical point of view, the perfect foresight 
assumption has the computationally appealing feature that the exact solution (to machine 
precision) for the equilibrium allocations of the neoclassical growth model can be 
computed quite easily. Indeed, by ex-ante attaching probability one to the exogenous 
shocks observed ex-post, the perfect foresight assumption expediently solves—at the cost 
of realism—the complex problem typically associated with the computation of 
mathematical expectations of endogenous variables in nonlinear problems. It is that 
complexity that often deters researchers from computing exact solutions to their models 
and leads them to resort instead to linear approximation techniques like the ones 
exploited in the main body of this chapter. In the case of the parsimonious neoclassical 
growth model used here, the perfect foresight assumption reduces the problem of 
computing the equilibrium allocations and decision rules to the relatively simple task of 
finding the deterministic saddle-path solution of that model with standard numerical 
methods. 
  To that end, we first reduced the analytical solution of the deterministic version of 
the neoclassical growth model in the main body of the paper to a system of two first-
order nonlinear difference equations in capital and labor, with the initial condition for the 
capital stock, k0, given by the level of capital stock actually observed at the beginning of 
1980. We then exploited the well-known saddle-path properties of the solution to that 
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 deterministic system (for parameter values in the usual range dictated by theory) to 
actually compute it. Namely, there is one and only one value for l0 (the fraction of time 
spent in market activities) that, in combination with the given initial capital stock k0, 
guarantees that the solution to that dynamic system of nonlinear difference equations 
converges to the balanced-growth path. Initial values of l0 different from the saddle-path 
solution  are associated either with explosive paths, along which the capital stock 
grows at rates progressively higher than that implied by the balanced-growth path, or 
with implosive ones, along which the initial capital is run down to zero. Exploiting this 




l0 0 associated with an explosive path and 
another one, l , associated with an implosive path. The initial value saddle-path solution 
must lie somewhere in between, which calls naturally for the bisection method we used to 
find it. In implementing that method, we adapted to the utility function used in this paper 
an algorithm that Alpanda and Amaral developed to compute the perfect foresight 




  The parameter values for our perfect foresight experiments were kept, of course, 
the same as in the experiments under rational expectations, except that we had to take 
into account that the algorithm for the perfect foresight experiments described above 
computes the exact (to machine precision) saddle-path of an economy with growth.
12 
Accordingly, the depreciation rate, the interest rate, and the discount factor were set to 
the values implied by balanced-growth path relationships, rather than steady state 
relationships.
13 
                                                 
11 We are thankful to Sami Alpanda and Pedro Amaral for having facilitated us the algorithm they 
developed in Matlab code. The adaptation used for this appendix is available from us upon request. 
12 Recall that the algorithm for the rational expectations experiments approximated the solution around the 
steady state, that is, for the economy without growth, following the calibration procedure suggested by 
Hansen in the paper mentioned in the main body of the paper. 
13 More specifically,  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + + + = γ η δ k
x = 0.087,  δ θ − = ) ( k y i = 0.113, 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 i + = +
− − γ
σ α β = 0.911, where i is the real interest rate. 
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   Figures B.2, B.3, B.4, and B.5 are the perfect foresight counterparts of the figures 
labeled with the same numerals in the text. As in text, the data and model predictions 
have been detrended by the applicable balanced-growth rates. 
  Comparison of Figures 4 and B.4 readily alerts that the results of the numerical 
experiments under perfect foresight are different from the stochastic version reported in 
the main body of the paper. That discrepancy can be traced to a large extent to the capital 
stock in Figure B.2. While the stochastic version of the model predicts the decline of the 
capital stock during the lost decade quite accurately, the perfect foresight version 
seriously underestimates that decline. To be more specific, according to the perfect 
foresight version, the (detrended) capital stock should have been 15 percent lower in 
1990, at the end of the lost decade, than it was in 1980—half the decline predicted by the 
rational expectations version. By contrast, the perfect foresight version overestimates the 
decline of labor input over that same period by twice as much as it does the rational 
expectations counterpart of the same experiment. 
  Given the non-negligible quantitative differences in the outcomes of the 
numerical experiments under the alternative perfect foresight and rational expectations 
assumptions, it is important to gain some intuition into their possible sources. To that 
effect, imagine at the onset of the Argentine depression two representative consumers 
that perfectly anticipated the unlikely streak of adverse TFP shocks that would hit the 
economy over the next decade or so. However, assume that only one of them perfectly 
anticipated as well the equally unlikely sequence of sizable positive TFP shocks that 
would hit the economy in the subsequent expansion. (Recall that according to Table 1, 
those shocks implied annual average productivity gains of around 4 percent over that 
expansion!)
14 For the sake of the argument, we’ll loosely refer to this last imaginary 
consumer as the consumer endowed with complete perfect foresight. The other imaginary 
observer, loosely referred to as the consumer with partial perfect foresight, expects 
productivity gains over the expansion to be in the order of magnitude historically 
observed, that is, 1.03 percent a year. 
  Theory suggests that in the face of a streak of adverse shocks like the ones 
observed in the lost decade in Argentina, both consumers will smooth their consumption 
                                                 
14 Computed by applying to the corresponding TFP factor in Table 1 the formula in Footnote 3. 
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 over that period by drawing down their savings, that is, the capital stock. However, the 
consumer with complete perfect foresight, aware that holding on to his capital will allow 
him to exploit the unusually high rates of return on that factor he believes are coming for 
sure in the subsequent recovery, will not want to deplete his savings (or capital stock) as 
much as the imaginary consumer with partial perfect foresight, who expects just normal 
productivity shocks and, thus, more moderate rates of return on his capital over that 
subsequent decade.  
  Figures 2 and B.2 bear well the intuition above. According to those figures, both 
of our imaginary consumers ran down their savings during the lost decade—but less so 
the consumer of the perfect foresight economy represented in Figure B.2, because he 
knew in advance that his relatively more thrifty behavior would be heftily rewarded in the 
subsequent recovery in the form of unusually high rental prices of capital. By contrast, 
our imaginary inhabitant of the rational expectations economy, represented in Figure 2, 
with forecasting capabilities closer to what ought to be expected from humans, attached a 
very low probability to the long streak of unusually high TFP shocks actually observed in 
the subsequent recovery. He expected instead that rental prices for capital over that 
period would be closer to the historical average. Accordingly, he didn’t mind running 
down his savings (capital stock) over the lost decade at a faster rate than his perfect 
foresight counterpart of Figure B.2. 
  The intuition behind the reported discrepancies between the perfect foresight and 
rational expectations versions of otherwise identical economies invites caution about 
interpreting the outcomes from numerical experiments under perfect foresight as a fair 
representation of the actual dynamics of the capital stock and other variables directly 
related to it (such as GDP, interest rates, etc.) in economies subject to a great deal of 
uncertainty. Such significant discrepancies are more likely to emerge in economies with 
wild swings in the exogenous shocks than in economies with less volatile shocks. It is for 
the former group of countries (to which, per the evidence in Table 1, Argentina seems to 
belong) that the perfect foresight assumption might be a particularly bad approximation 
to the way in which agents actually form their expectations about the future and therefore 
miss, by a potentially wide margin, the dynamics of labor and savings decisions along 
pronounced boom and bust cycles. 
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